Visiting Fellows

Below are the visiting fellows to the Applied Theory Initiative and the dates of their fellowships.

Guillaume Plantin, Toulouse School of Economics
June 1-5, 2015

Dirk Bergemann, Yale
May 4-8, 2015

Eduardo Perez-Richet, Ecole Polytechnique
May 12-16, 2014

Matt Elliot, California Institute of Technology
May 30-June 4, 2013

Marina Halac, Columbia University
May 20-26, 2013

Marcus Opp, University of California Berkeley
April 15-18, 2013

Larry Samuelson, Yale University
February 25, 2013

Andrea Prat, London School of Economics
October 15-17, 2012

Andrew Caplin, New York University
May 7-11, 2012

Bard Harstad, Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management
October 31- November 4, 2011

Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
May 16-20, 2011

Qi Chen, Duke University Fuqua School of Business
May 9-13, 2011

Gustavo Manso, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
March 28-April 1, 2011

Navin Karthik, Columbia University
November 8-12, 2010

Itay Goldstein, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
November 1-5, 2010

Jeff Ely, Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management
October 25-29, 2010

Ron Siegel, Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management
October 11-15, 2010

Guillaume Plantin, Toulouse School of Economics
May 17-21, 2010
Guillaume Plantin is a financial economist. He applies contract theory and coordination games to the study of the determinants of liquidity and financial stability. In standard asset pricing theory, the liquidity of claims to future consumption is assumed. In practice, liquidity does not come out of thin air, however. Instead, it is promoted by a set of financial institutions, norms, regulations, and contracts that are very diverse and sophisticated in modern financial systems. Through his research, Plantin seeks to understand why these institutional arrangements provide liquidity and financial stability, and to figure out why they sometimes fail to do so. His recent research focuses in particular on financial innovation and on the prudential regulation of financial intermediaries.

Nicola Persico, NYU
April 26-30, 2010
Nicola Persico holds the titles of professor of economics and a professor of law and society at New York University. His research interests include information acquisition, the efficiency of political systems, disparate treatment and racial profiling, team incentives for education in developing countries, search-theoretic approaches to markets for illicit goods, and a variety of topics in law and economics.

David Martimort, Toulouse School of Economics
March 15-19, 2010
David Martimort is professor of economics at the Toulouse School of Economics and a senior research fellow of the IDEI. His research interests span contract theory, industrial organization and political economy. He has been a visiting professor at Harvard University, MIT, Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, ECARE in Brussels, and is a member of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in the United Kingdom and a Fellow of the Econometric Society.

Niko Matouschek, Northwestern University
February 22-26, 2010
Niko Matouschek received his PhD in economics from the London School of Economics and has been at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management since 2001. He is an associate professor in the Department of Management and Strategy. Matouschek works on the economics of organizations and contracts. Topics he has examined include the design of decision rules, the effect of competition on the organization of firms, and the economics of the marriage contract. His papers have been published in a variety of economics journals, including American Economic Review, The Review of Economic Studies, and The RAND Journal of Economics. He is an associate editor of The RAND Journal of Economics, a research affiliate at the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), and a research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). In 2005 he received the Sidney J. Levy Teaching Award for teaching excellence in Kellogg elective classes.

Uday Rajan, University of Michigan
November 16-20, 2009
Uday Rajan uses game and contract theory to model strategic interaction in financial markets. His research explains puzzles such as the high cost of credit card loans and the rationing of allocations in IPOs. His current work focuses on asymmetric information in limit order markets and on informational frictions created by securitization. His publications include articles in the American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, and Journal of Financial Economics. He has received the GSAM award for best paper in the Review of Finance and the NYSE award for best paper on equity trading at the WFA meetings. 

David P. Myatt, Nuffield College, Oxford University
October 26-30, 2009
David Myatt's research is in the areas of game theory, evolutionary game theory, microeconomic theory, industrial organisation, and political science. His current areas of research include: (1) collective action problems (studying the classic problem of the private provision of a public good and the long-run behavior of players), (2) industrial organization (a new theory of advertising, product-line rivalry, and insights into oligopolistic price discrimination), (3) voting (including theories of tactical voting in plurality elections, empirical tests of these theories against UK data, and experimental study of a sequence of tactical voting experiments to test aspects of the theory that could not be addressed by existing data), and (4) wars of attrition (timing games in which it is costly to fight, but a prize is obtained if an opponent concedes first, but with an emphasis on the perceptions of strength relative to actual strength).

Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University
May 25-29, 2009
Michael Ostrovsky's research is in the areas of game theory, industrial organization, and corporate finance. Most recently, he has analyzed Internet advertising auctions, stability in vertical networks, and proxy voting by mutual funds. Ostrovsky is an associate professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, where he teaches managerial economics in the first year of the MBA program. His research primarily concerns game-theoretic issues related to mechanism design, industrial organization, and corporate finance. Most recently, he has examined the design of Internet advertising auctions, the structure of stable vertical networks, and the forces influencing proxy voting by mutual funds. Ostrovsky received his bachelor's degree in mathematics and economics from Stanford University and his PhD in business economics from Harvard University.

Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Research
April 20-24, 2009
Michael Schwarz is a principle research scientist at Yahoo! Research in Berkeley, Calif. Prior to joining Yahoo! he was a National Fellow at the Hoover institution at Stanford, and a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholar at UC Berkeley. He was on the faculty of Harvard University's Economics Department from 1999 to 2004. He is a member of the NBER. Schwarz specializes in economic theory and its applications to business decision-making and public policy. He works on a wide range of topics that include auction theory, decision-making under uncertainty, economics of standards, economics of drug procurement and Medicare Part D, and microstructure of financial markets. His current work applies game theory to the market for Internet advertisement and marketplace design. Schwarz's work has appeared in scholarly journals including American Economic Review and The RAND Journal of Economics. His academic papers have received attention in popular press. BusinessWeek reported that as a result of publication of a paper by Schwarz and two of his students, "Close-mouthed Google has opened up about AdWords since the three economists cracked its code" (March 6, 2006). Schwarz's work has been profiled in a number of other outlets, including the front page of the Wall Street Journal